With the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed on its 15th day following US and Israel's war on Iran, President Trump is urging a naval coalition to reopen the critical waterway. Yet Australia, despite possessing capable air defence warships, remains conspicuously absent from his public appeal for military support.
Trump named China, France, Japan, South Korea and the United Kingdom as nations he hoped would contribute warships to keep the strait "open and safe." Australia was notably omitted. Foreign Minister Penny Wong revealed the government had received a request from a non-participant nation in the region to consider military assistance, though she made clear Australia would not take on an "offensive role against Iran" and there would be no Australian boots on the ground.
The Strait of Hormuz is not a minor waterway. It carries a fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas, and remains effectively closed on the 15th day of the conflict. The closure is threatening global food security, with the strait critical for LNG exports that feed nitrogen-based fertilisers used to grow staple grains providing over 40 per cent of global caloric intake, while India has invoked emergency powers to protect 333 million LPG-dependent homes and the UN humanitarian chief has warned "millions of people are at risk."
Iran's blockade has allowed the country to impose a financial cost on the US and its oil-producing Gulf allies despite being outgunned militarily, though Trump's threat to use force to open the strait could invite further escalation that inflames global oil markets.
Strategic thinkers are split on whether Australia should contribute. Some argue a limited Australian deployment to defend Gulf states from Iranian missile and drone attacks is consistent with broader strategy, with targeted contributions helping detect and defend against attacks and supporting global trade through naval efforts to keep the strait open as Australia has done previously. Australia's air defence warships are recognised as serious assets that could help, alongside those from Japan, South Korea, France and Italy.
Yet the counterargument is compelling. Lengthy Middle East commitments have often undermined Australian Defence Force preparedness and distracted from China's growing military challenge in the region, and Australia's limited number of deployable surface combatants means any maritime commitment must be weighed carefully, with naval capability already stretched and any Gulf deployment risking preparedness for potential crises closer to home.
There is also fundamental doubt about whether a naval coalition can work at all. Security experts say there is no quick military solution, as all Iran needs to do is strike occasionally to keep insurers away, and sending naval vessels without diplomatic agreement would only expose expensive military assets to cheap but potentially effective projectiles. The Strait of Hormuz will reopen only with the consent of the Iranian government; no amount of US naval power can either force passage or safeguard it.
Australia's quiet stance may reflect this sobering reality. If the conflict begins to move beyond current US military objectives, Australia should resist expanding its commitment, particularly through ground forces, and remain firmly focused on the Indo-Pacific. Canberra appears to be following this counsel for now, acknowledging the crisis while managing its involvement with characteristic caution.