Sudan's conflict has entered a new and terrifying phase. Over 200 civilians have been killed by drone attacks in Sudan since March 4, according to UN rights chief Volker Turk, who said he was appalled by the escalation. This is not a gradual increase in violence; it represents a fundamental shift in how the nearly three-year-old civil war is being fought.
Strip away the talking points and what remains is a troubling reality: both the government-aligned Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces have discovered that drone warfare allows them to inflict mass casualties on civilian areas with minimal risk to their own forces. The fundamental question becomes whether the international community will allow this precedent to stand unchallenged.
The pattern of recent attacks reveals the deliberate nature of the campaign. The strike on the Adikong market near Sudan's eastern border in Chad on Thursday was the second deadly drone strike there in less than a month, according to Médecins Sans Frontières. At least 11 people were burned to death, while 23 people were brought to the hospital in Adre, Chad, among them seven children. The victims were overwhelmingly small-scale traders trying to earn a livelihood.
Even more disturbing was the attack on the White Nile province. An explosive-laden drone blamed on the RSF struck a secondary school and a health care centre in the village of Shukeiri, killing at least 17 people, mostly schoolgirls, with at least 10 wounded. There was no military presence in the village. This was not a mistake in targeting; it was a choice. In West Kordofan, at least 152 civilians were killed by SAF drone strikes, including at least 50 when a market and hospital were hit on March 4 in Muglad; attacks on two separate markets in RSF-controlled areas on March 7 left at least 40 civilians dead.
Consider the strategic logic at work. Drones have entered the scene in Sudan only in recent years, with their use now accelerating into "a preferred weapon of war"; their appeal is "cheap" and "easily launched from anywhere," making them "a weapon of mass terror." Drones have become a key weapon used by both sides in the war that began in April 2023.
The counter-argument deserves serious consideration: from a purely military perspective, drones have altered the balance of the conflict. The use of drones allowed the RSF to overcome the army's air dominance earlier in the conflict. The RSF, which has no conventional air force, relied on drone acquisition through supply networks from Chad and neighbouring states. The SAF, meanwhile, has received military support from multiple sources.
But here is where the analysis must confront an uncomfortable truth. Strategic advantage does not justify the targeting of schools, markets, and hospitals. The distinction between military and civilian infrastructure has collapsed in this war. Despite repeated warnings and appeals, parties to the conflict continue to use increasingly powerful drones to deploy explosive weapons with wide-area impacts in populated areas.
Institutional accountability is the critical missing element. Sudan's government has appealed to the UN Security Council, but enforcement has proven weak. The RSF has offered no meaningful response to accusations, maintaining a posture of deflection. Both sides blame each other for civilian casualties; both continue the practice. The brutal conflict between the Sudanese army and the RSF, now approaching its third year, has killed tens of thousands of people, displaced nearly 11 million and pushed multiple regions into famine conditions.
The question facing the international community is not complicated. When armed groups systematically target civilians with weapons they know will kill indiscriminately, the definition of war crime becomes academic. Drones have made it easier to kill without consequence. The real test is whether the world will accept that this is simply the new normal, or whether accountability will follow.