NASA's Office of Inspector General has released an audit assessing progress and shortcomings for SpaceX and Blue Origin in developing lunar landers for the Artemis program, with astronaut safety and delays as top concerns, though costs have remained on target.
The report acknowledges NASA's effective management of the fixed-price contracts with both companies. The report commends NASA's handling of the contracts, which were awarded to Blue Origin and SpaceX for vehicles Artemis astronauts will use to reach the lunar surface. Yet beneath this endorsement lie significant operational constraints that may undercut the safety assurances both the agency and contractors are meant to provide.
The most visible concern centres on SpaceX's lander design. Where the Apollo lunar module was 23 feet tall, SpaceX's Starship stands at 171 feet, about the equivalent of a 14-story-tall commercial building, according to the report. For Artemis, NASA has said the tilt must not exceed 8°, although navigating the terrain of the lunar South Pole will present a challenge. On the Apollo 15 mission, the lander settled at an approximate 11° tilt. The report notes Starship's height increases the risk its momentum will continue after landing causing it to tip over and Blue Moon could exceed the tilt tolerance for safe and effective execution of critical crew functions.
The elevator issue is equally troubling from an institutional accountability perspective. The crew compartment is approximately 115 feet off the ground and requires an elevator to get to and from the surface. If the elevator fails, there is no other way for the crew to get back into the vehicle. Starship's elevator sits just below the crew compartment and is approximately 115 feet above the ground. Currently, there is no other method for the crew to enter the vehicle from the lunar surface in the event of an elevator failure. SpaceX does not even plan to reach orbit, let alone demonstrate the elevator, which is deemed a top risk by the HLS program. By contrast, Blue Origin's Blue Moon lander is also taller than the Apollo vehicle at 53 feet, but unlike SpaceX, the crew compartment is considerably closer to the ground, allowing a ladder/stair arrangement.
A central problem flagged by the watchdog concerns the testing philosophy itself. The report highlighted NASA's departure from "Test Like You Fly" principles. While the requirement for uncrewed demonstrations of both the Starship-based HLS and Blue Origin's lander is a good way of ensuring the hardware performs as expected, the demonstration won't require life support systems to work, and won't check out the airlock. Although NASA later added a requirement that demonstration landers be able to ascend from the lunar surface, it did not require docking with Orion or the Gateway in lunar orbit. This creates a troubling gap: the demonstrations will not reduce the risk of subsequent missions as much as planners would like since the versions designed for humans will deviate significantly.
There is genuine disagreement between NASA and SpaceX over manual control. One issue involves the extent to which astronauts flying on board SpaceX's Starship should be able to take manual control of the vehicle during flights down to the lunar surface. There is disagreement between NASA and SpaceX on whether the provider's current proposed approach for landing meets the intent of the Agency's manual control requirement. Despite the provider's stated acknowledgment and commitment to meeting this requirement, NASA's tracking of SpaceX's manual control risk indicates a worsening trend. A design for Blue Origin's manual control has not yet been made.
The crew survival question looms largest. Like the Apollo landing missions more than 50 years ago, if Artemis astronauts encounter a life-threatening emergency in space or on the lunar surface, NASA does not have the capability to rescue the stranded crew. The Inspector General notes that while NASA is working to mitigate hazards, there are significant gaps in crew survival analyses, particularly concerning extended crew survival after a catastrophic but non-fatal event.
Artemis IV, currently pushing to fly in early 2028, is when one of the two landers aims to take astronauts down to the lunar surface for the first time since the end of the Apollo program in 1972. NASA agreed with the report's recommendations, including those around manual piloting and crew survival analyses.
The challenge here is balancing competing imperatives: maintaining fiscal discipline through fixed-price contracts, accepting commercial-sector innovation, and ensuring astronaut safety in an extraordinarily complex environment. The Inspector General has documented where those tensions remain unresolved. NASA has committed to addressing the recommendations. Whether that commitment translates into tangible risk reduction before crews ascend the Starship elevator remains an open question.