Australia has crossed a significant capability threshold. In early March, the first batch of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) missiles rolled off the production line at Port Wakefield in South Australia, marking the opening of the only facility outside the United States manufacturing these precision-guided weapons. The strategic implications are significant.
The GMLRS is a precision-guided munition used by the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), with a range exceeding 70 kilometres. Unlike conventional rockets, it features control actuation systems that allow mid-flight course correction, providing the accuracy required for extended-range strikes. From a national security perspective, developing and manufacturing these weapons domestically represents a fundamental shift in how Australia approaches defence production.
The Port Wakefield facility, operated through a partnership between Lockheed Martin Australia and the Australian Defence Force, represents the first phase of a much larger enterprise. The current phase is a risk-reduction activity certifying manufacturing processes, training protocols, equipment, and assembly techniques. Parts are currently sourced from the United States, but Australian industry is already preparing to manufacture components domestically. Moog Australia has been contracted to develop the control actuation system, a critical component that enables the missile's guidance and flight control. This partnership signals the government's commitment to building a deep supply chain within Australia rather than simply assembling imported components.
The facility will eventually employ around 20 manufacturing staff directly, with hundreds more jobs supported across the national supply chain. Yet the employment figures alone understate the strategic importance. The government is investing up to $21 billion over the next decade in the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) enterprise. Plans exist for a separate high-rate production facility capable of manufacturing up to 4,000 GMLRS missiles annually by 2029. This production capacity matters because it ensures Australia can maintain its own missile production during conflict, even if global supply chains fracture under regional tension.
The GMLRS facility is not an isolated project. The Department of Defence has announced that Australia is simultaneously investing up to $850 million with Kongsberg Defence Australia to establish a Naval Strike Missile and Joint Strike Missile manufacturing facility in New South Wales. That facility is scheduled to begin missile production in 2027, with full-rate production of 100 rounds annually targeted by 2028. The Defence ministry has also flagged plans to eventually manufacture the Precision Strike Missile, a more advanced weapon with future increments capable of striking targets over 1,000 kilometres away.
What this signals to potential adversaries is straightforward: Australia cannot be strangled through supply chain disruption. During a conflict scenario where the Strait of Hormuz closes or shipping lanes face interdiction, Australia would retain the capacity to manufacture guided munitions domestically. This is not abstract strategy. The Middle East conflict currently pressing global oil markets and disrupting aviation routes demonstrates the fragility of reliance on distant sources for critical military supplies.
The centre-right case for this investment rests on fiscal discipline and strategic realism. Yes, the $21 billion commitment is substantial. But the alternative is chronic vulnerability. During the Cold War, Australia built substantial defence manufacturing capacity. That capacity eroded over decades as governments prioritised cost savings and outsourced to allied nations. The strategic environment has since shifted. The Indo-Pacific is contested space. The distance from Australia to its major markets and allies means supply chain disruption carries real consequences. Investing now in manufacturing capacity is fiscally responsible hedging against a plausible risk.
The counterargument merits consideration. Critics rightly note that Australia's defence manufacturing costs are higher than comparable US or allied production. Some argue the money would be better spent on direct capability acquisition rather than building manufacturing infrastructure. The debate over whether to make or buy defence equipment legitimately involves questions about efficiency and value for money.
Yet the pragmatic middle ground is evident in the government's approach. Australia is not rejecting US manufactured weapons or ending allied partnerships. Rather, it is building selective sovereign manufacturing where supply chain vulnerability is highest and where Australian industry can develop genuine competitive advantage through innovation. The Moog Australia contract to develop control actuation systems is exactly this model: build where Australia can add distinctive value, partner where partnership makes sense.
The Port Wakefield facility opening marks a necessary recalibration in how Australia thinks about defence industrial capacity. For decades, the nation assumed uninterrupted access to allied supply and a stable international environment. Those assumptions no longer hold. Building sovereign manufacturing capability is not protectionism or military-industrial excess. It is prudent adaptation to a more contested strategic environment.