Jakarta's carefully calibrated diplomacy in the Middle East crisis faces its toughest test yet. When coordinated American and Israeli strikes killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on 28 February, they set off a cascade of problems for Indonesia's strategic positioning.
President Prabowo Subianto had joined Trump's Board of Peace initiative just weeks earlier, positioning Indonesia as a partner in post-war Gaza reconstruction. But that positioning began crumbling almost immediately. According to reporting from SBS News, the opening salvos in the conflict killed nearly 800 people, while a US military commander claimed the campaign was "ahead of game plan". The Jakarta Post reported that Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono suspended all Board of Peace discussions, telling reporters attention had "shifted to the situation in Iran".
The difficulty facing Jakarta is not diplomatic confusion but rather political backlash at home. As reported by The Jakarta Post, the Indonesian Ulema Council, the country's most influential Islamic body, issued a statement on 1 March declaring the Board of Peace ineffective and calling for immediate Indonesian withdrawal. Members of parliament joined the chorus. Lawmaker Oleh Soleh of the National Awakening Party urged the government to push for sanctions against the US and Israel, criticising Jakarta's "deep regret" statement as insufficient.
Yet withdrawal carries its own costs. Indonesia has been deepening ties with Washington through the bilateral Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and sees strategic value in closer alignment with the US during a period of regional competition with China. Defence partnership considerations matter too. The country is a net oil importer, meaning the disruption to Middle East supplies hits Indonesian households directly as petrol and energy costs rise.
The conflict presents Indonesia's leadership with a genuine complexity rather than a simple choice. Bank Indonesia had to intervene in currency markets to protect the rupiah from emerging market volatility. At the same time, Prabowo offered to travel to Tehran to mediate between all parties. As reported by The Diplomat, President Prabowo's willingness to facilitate negotiations signals Indonesia's diplomatic traditions of non-alignment and bridge-building. Foreign Minister Sugiono told reporters Jakarta would consult with Gulf states "under attack", acknowledging the regional destabilisation.
The longer the war continues, according to analysis from The Diplomat, the more likely Indonesia becomes to abandon the Board of Peace entirely. Domestic pressure is real. Yet withdrawal would signal to Washington that Jakarta cannot deliver on commitments made at senior levels. That too carries diplomatic cost.
This is not a story of Indonesia taking sides so much as the collision between two commitments that proved incompatible. A centre-right position would emphasise Indonesia's right to pursue its own interests, including security partnerships with the US, without subordinating domestic concerns to external pressure. Progressive advocates rightly note that Indonesia's Muslim majority has legitimate grievances about civilian casualties and the use of military force.
What emerges from the chaos is a more modest lesson. Nations pursuing middle-power diplomacy must accept that strategic relationships sometimes clash with domestic constituencies. Indonesia's challenge now is to find a path that acknowledges both the reality of US alliance-building and the genuine concerns of its own people. That may mean stepping back from the Board of Peace, at least while conflict rages. It may mean deeper conversations with Washington about what Indonesia can realistically deliver in future initiatives. The war has forced that reckoning forward.