There is a particular kind of political discomfort that comes with endorsing an ally's most consequential military action in a generation while simultaneously insisting you knew nothing about it until it was underway. That is precisely the position in which the Albanese government now finds itself, and the way it has handled the question will shape how Australia is perceived in both Washington and the broader international community for years to come.
On 28 February 2026, Israel and the United States launched a coordinated joint attack on various sites in Iran, codenamed Operation Roaring Lion by Israel and Operation Epic Fury by the US Department of Defense, targeting key officials, military commanders, and nuclear facilities with the stated aim of regime change. Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in the strikes, and Tehran launched an unprecedented wave of retaliatory attacks. At least 24 of Iran's 31 provinces were affected, with the Iranian Red Crescent reporting at least 201 people killed and 747 injured in the joint attacks.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese was one of the first world leaders to publicly endorse the US-Israeli military action, saying in a statement: "We support the United States acting to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and to prevent Iran continuing to threaten international peace and security." The Albanese government emphasised that it was not involved in the strikes and revealed that no prior warning was given to Australia before the strikes took place. The calculus here is straightforward, if politically unpalatable: supporting an ally's military objectives while publicly disclaiming knowledge of the operation raises uncomfortable questions about exactly what kind of alliance partnership Australia actually holds.
The government's statement pointed to a catalogue of Iranian conduct that informed its position: decades of destabilisation through ballistic missile and nuclear programmes, support for armed proxies, and at least two attacks directed against Australian soil in 2024, targeting Australia's Jewish community. In response to those attacks, Australia expelled Iran's ambassador, suspended operations at its embassy in Tehran, and listed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a state sponsor of terrorism. These are not trivial grievances, and any fair assessment of the government's position must acknowledge the substantive Iranian threat record that underpins it.
The question of Pine Gap sits at the centre of the controversy, and the government's handling of it has been, to put it charitably, incomplete. Foreign Minister Wong refused on Sunday to clarify the involvement of the joint Australian-US intelligence facility, stating the government "never comments on that facility." One of Pine Gap's primary functions is to locate radio signals in the Eastern Hemisphere, with collected information fed into the US drone programme — a role confirmed by an NSA document from 2013, which showed the facility plays a key role in providing geolocation data for military operations, including air strikes. The Greens were direct on the implication: Greens Senator Waters argued that "Labor has made Australia a part of this war by allowing Pine Gap and other US military bases here to be used to gather intelligence and target US bombs and missiles," and that people see through Labor when it says it believes in international law and then backs what the party labels illegal wars.
It warrants scrutiny whether the government's studied silence on Pine Gap adequately serves the Australian public's right to understand the degree of their country's involvement. The escalation has put approximately 100 Australian defence personnel stationed in the region at risk, including troops based at the Al Minhad Air Base in the United Arab Emirates. These are not abstract stakes.
The legal dimension is the sharpest edge of the criticism. Asked whether the weekend attack was legal and whether he was concerned it might erode the international rules-based order, Albanese said those judgements were for the US and those directly involved, and expressed hope the actions would lead to a "swift resolution." Ben Saul, Challis Chair of International Law at the University of Sydney, told SBS that the US and Israeli actions are breaching one of the most fundamental rules of the international order established since 1945. International assessments have found no evidence Iran has an active nuclear weaponisation programme, and it is a signatory to the UN's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, while Israel is not a signatory and is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons itself.
Those are serious propositions, and the progressive case against Australia's endorsement carries genuine weight. One need only recall the precedent set in 2003, when Australia joined the invasion of Iraq on the basis of weapons of mass destruction claims that proved unfounded. Nationals Senator Matt Canavan, an unlikely voice of caution from within the Coalition, articulated the concern with some precision. He told The Conversation that "not a single regime change war has left the world a better place in my lifetime," acknowledging it was good to see the Ayatollah gone, but drawing the comparison: "It was great to see Saddam and Gaddafi gone too. Now things are much worse for those countries and the region."
There is nonetheless bipartisan support in Australian politics for the operation, despite warnings of a major breach of international law, with the government's backing of the action to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran finding broad agreement across the major parties. Shadow foreign minister Ted O'Brien stated: "Our position is clear: Israel has the right to defend itself and Iranians have the right to live free of oppression." That the Coalition and the government arrived at the same destination through different routes does not make the destination wrong — the Iranian regime's conduct, including its massacre of thousands of its own citizens during the 2025-26 protests, gives the strategic case genuine substance.
The institutional implications extend well beyond the current news cycle. Just one day before the strikes began, Oman's Foreign Minister stated that a diplomatic breakthrough had been reached and Iran had agreed to never stockpile enriched uranium and to full verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency, with peace described as "within reach." The strikes proceeded regardless. That context will feature in every future Australian debate about the reliability of alliance-driven security commitments as a substitute for independent diplomatic engagement.
Australia is a country that has consistently — and correctly — championed the rules-based international order as the foundation of its security and prosperity. The electorate demands, and rightly so, that its government be able to articulate precisely how endorsing military action of questionable legality, without prior notice, is consistent with that long-held position. Foreign Minister Wong's call for diplomacy and de-escalation following the strikes is welcome, but it arrives after the fact. Wong said that despite Australia supporting the US strikes, the "key question is what happens next", and urged de-escalation, saying Australia, "like so many other countries, we do not want escalation and a full-scale war, and we continue to call for dialogue and diplomacy."
Reasonable people can weigh the genuine threat of a nuclear Iran against the costs of extra-judicial military unilateralism and arrive at different conclusions. What is less reasonable is for a government to endorse an ally's action, disavow foreknowledge, decline to address the legal questions, and then call for diplomacy — all within 48 hours — without accounting for the contradictions that posture contains. Australia's long-term interest lies not in reflexive alignment, but in an alliance relationship mature enough to accommodate, on occasion, a frank and public disagreement about method. That conversation, for now, has not been had.